Younger Americans overwhelmingly support legal marijuana. Republican voters don’t. In December, Trump sided with neither– he sided with the lobbyists, and the market immediately called his bluff.
On paper, President Trump’s December executive order to reclassify marijuana looked like a win: a policy tweak that could lift a strangling tax regime off legal cannabis firms, free up research, and– if you were a cannabis lobbyist– clear a path to bigger markets and fatter profits. For an administration that tracks headlines and stock ticks, it was the sort of move designed to score on both politics and the markets.
Instead, the market yawned. The AdvisorShares Pure U.S. Cannabis ETF plunged roughly 27% the day the order was announced and is down about a third from its preannouncement highs. Investors didn’t celebrate. The logic behind the sell-off is straightforward but quite telling: politics and process matter more than a single presidential flourish– especially in an industry scarred by broken promises and regulatory ambiguity.
This moment reveals three things:
Lobbying is a far stronger current in Washington than many voters think
The GOP coalition is not uniformly on board with rescheduling
Money in cannabis markets– where hot tax bills and trapped liabilities sit on balance sheets– won’t be liberated by an executive-order headline alone.
What Trump actually did
The December order instructed the attorney general to expedite the rulemaking process to move marijuana from Schedule I (grouped with heroin and LSD) to a lower schedule under the Controlled Substances Act. In theory, rescheduling would be transformative for operators: it would end the monopoly of a tax rule that prevents firms that “touch the plant” from deducting normal business expenses, a quirk that has produced effective tax rates reportedly in the 60%-90% range for many operators and left multistate farms with crippling unpaid liabilities. WSJ reporting cites estimates showing only about $600 million paid against roughly $2.6 billion in alleged liabilities across the top U.S. multistate operators through September 2025. This helps explain why the industry lobbied so hard for relief.
Why investors didn’t care
If rescheduling would ease taxes and unlock corporate economics, why did the market punish cannabis shares? The immediate answers are likely behavioral.
First: buy-the-rumor, sell-the-news. The uptick in prices in the lead-up to the announcement likely priced in a brisk, clear outcome. When the announcement arrived without instant resolution on a timetable that investors trusted, traders took profits.
Second: process risk. Rescheduling via rulemaking can take months or years, and it courts litigation.
Third: narrow relief. The order did not instantly unshackle the industry: federal recreational prohibition would remain unless Congress moved. Important structural limitations– access to mainstream banking, ability to list on U.S. exchanges, and the fog around enforcement– were left for another day.
That combination of partial relief and long timelines is poor petrol for a market that runs on diesel.
This favors nobody
What should be irritating for those who still subscribe to a tidy left-right story of policy is just how visibly lobbying reconfigured the politics here. WSJ reporting traces how industry figures– most prominently CEOs of large multistate operators– pushed for rescheduling, marshalled narratives about taxation and patients, and cultivated access inside the administration. The result: a president who campaigned as a culture warrior and who has a base skeptical on drugs nonetheless took a step that many conservative leaders openly opposed. This dynamic of industry money bending a conservative administration away from some of its rank-and-file preferences would be striking on its own. But it’s more striking because it’s so public.
For years, legalization has been a generational and partisan story: younger Americans tilt strongly in favor of legalization; older conservatives tend not to. Pew polling from 2025 shows that support for legalization is highest among those under 30 (roughly two-thirds or more), while Republicans in aggregate are less enthusiastic. In fact several republican senators came out dissenting to Trump’s decision. The political payoff for Trump, who needs to hold his base while reaching swing voters, was therefore far from obvious. The lobbyists, however, had a clearer short-term objective: rescheduling that would materially improve corporate psyches and balance sheets. The administration delivered the instruction.
The GOP fraying
This move also exposed fissures within the broader Republican coalition. Gallup polling from October 2025 showed a notable drop in Republican support for legalization compared with the prior year; Republican enthusiasm has slipped, even as overall national support remains majority-positive. In short: the president’s action risks alienating parts of his base that remain cautious about drug policy change, even if centrist and younger voters might welcome it. For a politician whose campaign calculus often prizes headlines and immediate market reactions, that dissonance is worth noting.
Young people and the “not enough” problem
If you’re under 30, rescheduling by administrative fiat isn’t the same thing as legalization and the social justice package many younger voters want. Young voters tend to care about sentencing reform and broad access, not merely a tax fix for corporate operators. Pew and other polling consistently show high support for legalization among younger cohorts; they’ve also shown less patience for half-measures that benefit corporations more than communities. For activists and younger consumers, the story isn’t “did the taxes get fixed?”; it’s “did we right the harms?” If the answer is “no,” the lobbying-driven policy looks like a fix engineered for corporate benefit, nothing like a reform. That feeds the perception, fair or not, that lobbying bought a policy that is politically convenient but incomplete to serve the people.
Why lobbying looks bad here
Let me give you some numbers to start.
A 2023 Pew Research survey found that 73% of U.S. adults believe lobbyists and special interest groups have too much influence on the decisions made by members of Congress.
A large, bipartisan majority of Americans (65%) has favored increasing lobbying restrictions on former government officials and members of Congress.
80% of U.S. adults think large campaign donors have too much influence on Congress’s decisions.
Lobbying is a routine part of Washington. What feels different in this case is the dissonance between the political coalition’s public posture and policy outcomes, and the speed with which industry pressure appears to have shifted the president’s view. This feeds the argument that corporate money and influence can push policy in ways that are detached from the priorities of rank-and-file voters and younger civic actors. That is poison for an administration that prizes authenticity and populist transparency. Economically, it’s poison for an industry that needs durable, bipartisan rules to attract institutional capital.
Investors’ number 1 biggest fear is uncertainty. They want reliable tax treatment, banking access, and the ability for U.S. growers to list on major exchanges. The executive order addresses tax treatment in principle, but it doesn’t consolidate the plumbing. Until that plumbing is fixed, until banks freely serve legal operators, until listing rules clear, until enforcement and federal-state patchwork resolve, capital will continue to treat this sector as cyclical and vulnerable to headline politics. Reuters reporting agrees: banks remain cautious, and many cannabis firms lack access to top-tier financial services despite the political signal.
A modest conclusion and a larger question
Trump’s rescheduling gambit was both more and less than it looked: more in that it acknowledged a long-standing inequity in tax treatment and accelerated a regulatory process; less in that it did not deliver the immediate market or political return its backers hoped for. Investors punished the uncertainty. Young voters won’t necessarily be swayed by a half-measure that keeps the core of criminal-justice issues in place. And the most significant winner in the short term may be the lobbying apparatus itself, which proved it can bend policy across party instincts when the incentives align.
That’s a long way of saying: the markets, young people, and the public are all telling the same story in different languages. An executive order is just a messenger; it does not, by itself, fix an industry’s broken plumbing– or a democracy’s outsized appetite for influence.
Thanks for reading,
J&E