If you’ve been anywhere near financial media over the past two weeks, you’ve heard the drumbeat: private credit is in trouble. Blue Owl Capital restricted redemptions from one of its funds, Jamie Dimon is talking about “cockroaches,” and Jeffrey Gundlach is calling the entire asset class “garbage loans.” Cable news is running segments with phrases like “shadow banking crisis” and “the next 2008.”

Let’s take a breath.

I’m not here to tell you that everything is fine. It isn’t triple A. Although the gap between what is actually happening in private credit and what the headlines suggest is happening is wide enough to drive a leveraged buyout through. And if you’re making allocation decisions based on the panic cycle rather than the data, you’re certainly going to end up on the wrong side of this trade.

Blue Owl: Liquidity Problem Dressed Up as a Credit Problem

Here’s the much needed sequence of events, stripped of the drama. Blue Owl Capital, one of the largest players in private credit with a heavy concentration in software lending, faced elevated redemption requests in its semi-liquid fund, OBDC II. Rather than fire-selling assets into a skittish market, the firm sold $1.4 billion in loans to institutional buyers — and here’s the detail most people glossed over — at 99.7 cents on the dollar. That doesn’t seem like a distressed sale to me. Rather, that price signals institutional buyers see value, not wreckage.

Blue Owl then replaced its voluntary quarterly redemption structure with scheduled capital distributions. This was clumsy from an operations standpoint, and the market punished the stock accordingly — shares fell roughly 50% over the past year. But the underlying assets traded at near-par. The “crisis” here is a crisis of fund structure and investor expectations, not of credit quality.

The Default Picture: Worse Than Reported, Better Than Feared

The Proskauer Private Credit Default Index — the closest thing we have to an industry-standard measure — clocked in at 2.46% for Q4 2025, up from 1.84% the prior quarter. That is definitely an uptick, but 2.46% on a senior-secured, first-lien loan portfolio is not alarming by historical standards of corporate lending.

The more honest number comes when you include what analysts are calling “shadow defaults” — companies that haven’t technically defaulted but are paying interest via PIK (payment-in-kind) rather than cash, or have gone through liability management exercises that avoid triggering a formal default. The Lincoln Index pegs this broader distress rate at around 6.4% as of Q4 2025, up from 2.5% in Q4 2021. That’s meaningful, but also missing some context.

The broadly syndicated leveraged loan market — public, transparent, and widely held by CLOs and mutual funds — has a default rate projection of 7.3–7.9% for 2026 according to Moody’s. Private credit, even on the adjusted basis, is outperforming its public-market cousin. This is exactly what you’d expect from a market dominated by first-lien, senior-secured positions with stronger covenants.

The Real Risk is Structure, Not Credit

If there’s a genuine vulnerability in private credit right now, it isn’t in the loan books — it’s in how those loans were packaged and sold. Beginning around 2020, major alternative asset managers including Blue Owl, Apollo, and Blackstone began aggressively marketing semi-liquid private credit funds to retail investors. Bank-like yields with bond-like stability, accessible through your brokerage account. Seems too good to be true! (a financiers last words…)

The problem is that “semi-liquid” is a term of art. These funds invest in illiquid, privately negotiated loans with no secondary market. When redemption requests pile up — as they did at Blue Owl — managers face a structural mismatch. You cannot offer daily or quarterly liquidity on a portfolio of three-to-seven year loans without eventually hitting a wall.

This isn’t unique to private credit. We’ve seen the same movie in real estate (Blackstone BREIT in 2022), UK pension funds (the LDI crisis), and money market funds (2008). The issue is always the same: liquid wrappers around illiquid assets create fragility.

The AI Wildcard

There is a new wrinkle developing in the private credit domain; AI disruption risk. Blue Owl has more than 70% of its loan book in software companies — businesses that were considered recession-proof cash-flow machines when the loans were underwritten. The emergence of capable AI tools is raising real questions about whether some of these companies will see their competitive moats eroded faster than anticipated.

But it isn’t so straightforward: enterprise software companies with deep integrations, high switching costs, and mission-critical workflows are not going to be displaced overnight. They are sticky. The AI scare is repricing valuations at the equity level, which is painful for sponsors but doesn’t directly impair the ability of a well-run software company to service first-lien debt. Debt investors get paid before equity holders get wiped out — exactly the point of the capital structure.

That said, if you’re underwriting a five-year credit to an unknown SaaS company with a single product and no clear AI strategy, your risk calculus sure has changed. This disproportionately affects managers like Blue Owl who were heavily themed toward software, but is it “private credit” problem? No. Just sector-concentration problem.

Where the Bodies Might Actually Be Buried

Rather than panicking about a systemic collapse, here’s where I’d focus attention. First, yield compression. At the peak in 2023, private credit was generating all-in yields above 11%. Today, with SOFR at 3.73% and spreads tightening from competition, you’re looking at roughly 8.5%. That’s still attractive relative to public credit, but the margin of safety has shrunk considerably. You’re getting paid less to take more risk in a later-cycle environment — the definition of an asymmetric bet you don’t want to be on the wrong side of.

Second, transparency. The Renovo case — where BlackRock and other lenders marked debt at 100 cents on the dollar until shortly before writing it down to zero — is a reminder that private credit valuation remains more art than science. Until the industry adopts better real-time reporting and independent valuation governance, this opacity will remain a risk factor.

Third, regulatory contagion. Treasury Secretary Bessent’s public comments about risks migrating from private credit into the regulated banking system suggest that Washington is watching. JPMorgan disclosed $160 billion in loans to nonbank financial firms, triple the 2018 figure. If a genuine credit cycle takes hold, the interconnectedness between private lenders and traditional banks will be tested.

So Is It a Bubble? (No. But It’s Thin and Shiny)

Private credit is not in crisis. It is, however, going through its first real stress test since the post-GFC boom began. Default rates are rising but remain manageable. Blue Owl’s woes are primarily a story of fund structure and retail expectations, not of collapsing credit quality (the loans sold at 99.7 cents on the dollar). The AI disruption narrative is real but early-stage, and it’s a sector-specific risk, not an asset-class-wide one.

The market is projected to grow from roughly $2 trillion today to nearly $5 trillion by 2030. But the era of indiscriminate lending at fat spreads is over. Going forward, manager selection, sector diversification, and an honest assessment of liquidity terms will separate the winners from the casualties.

The headlines want you to panic. The data suggests you should pay attention, be selective, and keep your head. That’s not as exciting as screaming “bubble,” but it’s almost certainly closer to the truth. And the truth pays a lot better. Most of the time…

See ya, folks. Stay curious.

—J&E