Big Brother': Someone to Watch Over Us, via '1984' - WSJ

Leonardo — the Italian aerospace and defense giant, through its U.S. security arm — is pitching an upgrade to the automatic license plate readers already mounted over American roads. The product, called SignalTrace, doesn’t just photograph your plate. It sweeps the radio environment around your car: the Bluetooth handshake from your earbuds, your fitness tracker, your phone, the RFID chip in your key card, even the signals from your tire pressure sensors and infotainment system. When the same cluster of devices repeatedly travels with the same vehicle, the system’s algorithms bind them together into what Leonardo’s own marketing calls an electronic fingerprint — a persistent identifier that follows you, not your car. Swap the plates, borrow a friend’s sedan; the fingerprint rides along in your pocket. The data flows into a searchable operations center for, in the company’s phrasing, future queries and analysis. Every car that passes, not just the suspects. Leonardo’s U.S. arm already holds federal contracts, including with Special Operations Command, and the pitch is aimed squarely at law enforcement and border agencies.

Civil libertarians have responded on schedule, and their legal point is real: license plate readers survived constitutional scrutiny on the theory that a cop standing on a corner could lawfully write down every plate that passed. There is no cop-with-a-notebook equivalent for harvesting the Bluetooth identifiers of everyone’s headphones. The tech has outrun its own legal metaphor, and the courts will have to say something eventually.

But this newsletter’s job is to price things honestly, and so here is the question almost nobody in the outrage cycle wants to ask: what, exactly, is the asset being taken from you — and what was it actually worth?

Strip the emotion and define the thing precisely. What SignalTrace erodes is not privacy in your home, your messages, your medical records, or your finances. It is something much narrower: the ability to move through public space without a durable record of having done so. Call it locational anonymity.

The comparables are devastating to the outraged position, because this asset has been trading for years and the clearing price is approximately zero. Your phone carrier has always known where you are; that’s how cell towers work. Google and Apple hold location histories more granular than anything a roadside camera will ever assemble. Adtech data brokers buy and sell your movement patterns harvested from apps, and Americans hand over that exact locational fingerprint — willingly, contractually, at scale — in exchange for a free weather widget and a map that reroutes around traffic. Economists call the gap between what people say privacy is worth and what they accept for it the privacy paradox, and in study after study, people claiming to deeply value their location privacy will trade it for a discount coupon. Revealed preference is the most honest polling that exists, and it says the median American prices locational anonymity somewhere below the cost of a premium app subscription. The outrage over SignalTrace asserts that the state’s camera takes something precious; the market data says we already sold it, repeatedly, cheerfully, to entities with far fewer legal constraints than a police department.

And what were the cash flows of this asset while we held it? Be honest about the use case. Locational anonymity in public — the specific freedom to travel unrecorded — pays its dividends overwhelmingly in one currency: the ability to be somewhere without accountability for it. Richard Posner made the unfashionable version of this argument decades ago in his economics of privacy: much of what we defend as privacy is, functionally, the concealment of information that would change how others deal with us — concealment that lets people misrepresent themselves in the market of social life. For the law-abiding, the anonymous commute is a dividend that never gets collected; your trip to the grocery store gains nothing from being unrecorded. The parties actually harvesting yield from locational anonymity are car thieves, stalkers, hit-and-run drivers, kidnappers, and traffickers — for whom the unrecorded road is core operating infrastructure. When a technology’s benefits accrue disproportionately to a population’s worst actors while its costs fall on abstractions, it becomes, no longer, a protection of a vital human right, but also a subsidy for criminal behavior. To preach privacy above all else is to say, “criminality is humanity!”

Meanwhile the other side of the trade is concrete. Plate-reader networks recover stolen vehicles and stolen children with regularity; the correlation layer SignalTrace adds — the fingerprint that survives a plate swap — attacks precisely the countermeasure that professional criminals use. The safety dividend is real, measurable, and flows to everyone.

The objection that deserves an answer

The strongest counterargument is not about privacy at all. It’s about counterparty risk. Google can profile your movements, but Google cannot arrest you; the state can. Power asymmetry changes the risk profile of identical data. Critics will add the chilling-effect argument: that people who know they’re recorded attend fewer protests, visit fewer clinics, worship less freely and the mission-creep argument, that databases built for stolen cars end up queried for everything else, by every agency, forever. These are serious points, and the honest version of my argument has to meet them rather than wave at them.

Every one of those objections is an argument about use, not collection — about what the state may do with the record, not whether the record exists. And that distinction is where the privacy debate has been fighting the wrong war for twenty years. Collection is a lost battle; the sensors are cheap, the data exhaust is everywhere, and no legal regime on earth is going to re-anonymize the American road. Use is a winnable battle: warrant requirements for queries, audit logs on every search, retention limits, criminal penalties for misuse, exclusion of evidence from ungoverned databases. The countries and states that have gotten this right didn’t ban the cameras — they built glass boxes around the query terminal. Demanding “no collection” in 2026 is demanding the tide not come in; demanding “no ungoverned use” is building a seawall. The irrational position isn’t wanting protection from the state. It’s spending finite political capital defending an anonymity that no longer exists instead of governing the surveillance that undeniably does.

So yes: the camera on the overpass now knows your earbuds are in the car. The unpopular truth is that this information was never really yours alone, was worth less than the outrage implies, and buys back something of actual value. The rational response is not to mourn the asset. It’s to read the terms of the trade and then negotiate, hard, over enforcement.

Thanks for reading & as always, stay curious folks!

—J&E