
There’s a class of companies that can’t be disrupted by Silicon Valley, can’t be killed by regulation, and can’t be shamed into irrelevance. They sell cigarettes, run casinos, manufacture weapons, and charge 400% APR on two-week loans. They also, inconveniently, keep beating the market.
These are the stocks that aren’t polite enough for your 401ks. The ones that society won’t touch. The ones your ESG-screened index fund automatically excludes so your retirement account can sleep at night.
Here’s the problem with sleeping well at night: it’s expensive.
A Century of Inconvenient Returns
In 2009, Harrison Hong and Marcin Kacperczyk published a paper in the Journal of Financial Economics with the almost-too-on-the-nose title “The Price of Sin.” They documented that sin stocks (their term, not mine) generated approximately 2.5% higher annual returns than comparable “virtuous” companies across European and North American markets. Compounded over 20 years, that’s the difference between a comfortable retirement and a very comfortable retirement.
Frank Fabozzi and his colleagues went further. Their sin stock portfolio returned 19% annually, which makes you wonder if morality has a quantifiable cost, and if so, whether anyone’s disclosed it in the footnotes.
More recent research through 2025 puts the sin stock premium at roughly 3.5% to 5.2% annual excess returns, depending on how you weight the portfolio. The premium is strongest in gambling and defense stocks — the two categories that combine maximum social stigma with maximum pricing power. Funny how that works.
And this isn’t a fluke of cherry-picked time periods. One study tracked tobacco stocks specifically over 115 years — from 1900 to 2014 — and found they outperformed the broader market by 4.5% annually in the US and 2.6% in the UK. We are talking about a century of data; it’s a pattern that has survived two world wars, a Great Depression, the invention of the internet, and approximately eleven million public health campaigns.

Shame as a Moat
In business strategy, a “moat” is anything that protects a company’s profits from competition. Warren Buffett loves the concept. He certainly wouldn’t love the moat I’d like to introduce you all to: disgust and shame.
When an industry is socially toxic, it repels consumers as well as competitors, talent, and capital. Think about who’s going to raise a Series A to disrupt the payday lending industry. Think about the Stanford MBA who’s going to put “VP of Marketing, Altria” on their LinkedIn. Think about the venture capital partner who’ll pitch their LPs on a new tobacco startup.
Nobody. That’s who.
This is the paradox of reputational toxicity. The same social forces that make these companies pariahs at cocktail parties make them nearly impossible to compete against. Regulation adds another layer. You can’t just open a casino — you need licenses that cost millions and take years to secure. You can’t launch a new cigarette brand — advertising restrictions make customer acquisition effectively impossible for newcomers. You can’t start a defense company — government contracts require security clearances, decades of relationships, and the kind of infrastructure that makes Big Tech look agile.
OnlyFans is maybe the purest modern case study in shame as a business model. The platform generated over $6.6 billion in gross revenue in 2024, paid out $5.3 billion to creators, and reported operating profits north of $500 million. And yet: no major payment processor wants to be associated with it. Banks have tried to cut it off. Apple won’t list it in the App Store. The company has explored going public and been told, more or less politely, that Wall Street doesn’t do that. Every institutional door is closed — which means no competitors with venture backing are lining up to challenge it, no private equity firms are funding alternatives at scale, and OnlyFans sits alone in a market it effectively owns. The stigma is the entire strategy. The company is printing money precisely because no respectable capital source will touch the space.
ESG: Exclude, Stigmatize, Gift-Wrap
The rise of ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) investing was supposed to punish bad companies by starving them of capital. If enough investors refuse to buy sin stocks, prices fall, the cost of capital rises, and these companies slowly wither. Virtue as a market force.
What actually happened is closer to the opposite.
As of 2019, roughly 75% of the large-cap equity universe is underweight tobacco. Around 160 institutional investors representing $11 trillion in assets have signed the Tobacco-Free Finance Pledge. ESG-screened funds have systematically excluded gambling, weapons, adult entertainment, and alcohol producers.
All of this selling pressure pushes sin stock prices below their fundamental value. Which means their dividend yields go up. Which means their price-to-earnings ratios go down. Which means contrarian investors — the ones who don’t particularly care about the opinion of their university endowment committee — get to buy excellent businesses at a permanent discount.
The institutional ownership gap tells the story. Between 2000 and 2009, the gap between institutional ownership of sin stocks versus comparable non-sin stocks was 4.3%. By 2010–2019, that gap had widened to 7.9%. ESG didn’t close the sin premium. It widened it.
Altria currently yields around 7%. British American Tobacco yields about 5.5%. Philip Morris sits at roughly 4%. The S&P 500 average dividend yield is approximately 1.3%. And these aren’t the junk companies paying unsustainable dividends out of desperation you think they are. These are cash-generating, well-run businesses whose prices are artificially depressed because owning them is embarrassing.
ESG created a permanent buy opportunity. It just did it for the wrong team.

Downturns Don’t Cure Anything
There’s a dark economic insight embedded in the performance of sin stocks during downturns: when the economy contracts, people don’t stop drinking, smoking, or gambling. They do more of it.
The data from 2008 is instructive. Between October 2007 and January 2008, as the S&P 500 fell 15%, the tobacco subindex actually rose 5.3%. During the full crash from May 2008 to March 2009, the S&P 500 cratered 50.3%. Altria fell 25.1%. British American Tobacco fell 33.3%. These are still ugly numbers — but surviving a 50% market crash with a 25% drawdown while collecting a 7% dividend is, in relative terms, a very good year.
Japan Tobacco saw cigarette sales increase 10.8% in 2008. Altria’s gross turnover rose 15.2% — during the worst recession in 70 years. People were losing their homes and buying more cigarettes.
In 2022, when the S&P 500 dropped 18.1%, the Vice Fund (VICEX) returned positive 3.26%. Not “less bad.” Positive. While the Nasdaq was having an existential crisis, vice stocks were quietly doing what they always do.
Economists have a term for this: inelastic demand. For those who need a refresher, it means demand doesn’t change much when prices or incomes change. Cigarettes are inelastic. Alcohol is inelastic. Gambling is inelastic — and arguably has inverse elasticity during recessions, because desperation and entertainment-seeking both spike when times are hard.
The even less charitable interpretation: addiction is the ultimate business model. The product sells itself. The customer can’t leave. The worse the economy gets, the more they need their particular fix. If you designed a recession-proof business from scratch, it would look exactly like a tobacco company.

Virtue Is Overpriced
None of this means you should dump your 401(k) into a basket of cigarette and casino stocks. This isn’t investment advice. (Although if it were, the irony of a financial disclaimer on an article about sin stocks would be almost too perfect.)
But it’s worth sitting with the uncomfortable implications.
The financial system has become remarkably good at performing virtue. ESG funds have hundreds of billions in assets. Companies publish elaborate sustainability reports. Institutional investors compete to sign pledges. The message is clear: we care about doing good. We are responsible stewards.
Meanwhile, the sin stocks — expelled from polite portfolios, excluded from indexes, shunned at conferences — quietly outperform. Not always. Not every year. But over decades, with a consistency that makes the moral case for exclusion look less like conviction and more like a luxury good that wealthy investors purchase to feel better about themselves.
The question isn’t whether sin stocks outperform. The data is fairly settled on that. The question is what that outperformance means.
One reading: markets are efficient at pricing risk and return, and the social exclusion of sin stocks creates a genuine market inefficiency — a mispricing driven not by fundamentals but by cultural discomfort. If that’s true, then the sin premium is just arbitrage waiting to be collected by anyone willing to tolerate the dinner party awkwardness.
Another reading: human vice is simply more durable than human virtue. We are creatures of habit, addiction, and escapism, and the companies that serve those impulses have a more reliable customer base than the ones betting on our better angels. Tobacco has a 115-year track record. Solar energy does not.
I’m not saying the second reading is correct. I’m saying both readings lead to the same place: the market has learned to reward public virtue while the companies that profit from our private vices compound quietly in the background.
The stocks you’d be most ashamed to own are the ones that perform most reliably. The companies doing the most social good get the highest valuations — which means, mathematically, they offer the lowest future returns. Virtue is overpriced. Vice is on sale. And the market, with its usual indifference to human feelings, just keeps clearing.
Maybe the lesson is that markets don’t have morals. They have prices. And the gap between what we say we value and what we actually pay for — well, that gap is where the sin premium lives.
Whether you choose to collect it is, as they say, a personal decision.
See ya, folks. Stay curious.
—J&E
The data in this article draws on academic research by Hong & Kacperczyk (2009), Fabozzi et al. (2008), as well as market data from Yahoo Finance, Alpha Architect, Russell Investments, and Columbia Business School. This is not financial advice. Past performance, as always, is a liar with good posture.