The Biggest Teenage Sneakerhead!

There’s a certain ritual that certain folks who were high schoolers during 2018 - 2020 know very well: you wake up at 9:55AM, five minutes away from the drop of a new Nike Dunk on the SNKRS App that you know you could flip for $150/pair if you so chose. For ninenty seconds you are in a lottery against bots, resellers, and every other kid who set the same alarm. Normally, you lose. But a small handful of times, you actually got the shoe! And when you did, you felt like you were on top of the world; you owned something that no one else had; something that all your friends would see and understand, you were special.

That ritual is entirely dead now. Teenagers who would have taken part in this in the past just aren’t anymore. It isn’t that the sneaker has disappeared as a concept or a product category: people still buy billions of dollars worth of them every year, and that number is growing (albeit, slowly). What’s vanished is the culture and the feeling that made a sneaker special—that made it more than just a collection of rubber and foam in some unusual shape. The meaning is gone.

This might sound overly philosophical and ponderous for an economics and markets essay, but fear not, there is real market ramifications of what we are talking about. When you lose the meaning in a world like “sneakers,” you lose your pricing power. That is the story of what we see coming around the corner. This article is about a generation (my generation, Gen Z) that looked at one of the most remarkable, passionate, and powerful fashion subcultures in history, sneakers, and decided that it just wasn’t for them.

Let’s start by looking at the brands, because the split is most clear there. The companies whose shoes mattered culturally, not just functionally, are the ones who are bleeding the most right now. The companies that make functional shoes for running, training walking, comfort, and leisure — those are growing fast. The fault line between who is winning in sneakers and who is losing is exactly that: do they depend on cultural cache or functional use.

Just look at the Jordan Brand. I’d call it one of the purest cultural assets in the footwear industry. It has seen revenue fall 16% to $7.3 billion in fiscal 2025, making it Nike’s worst performing segment. Converse posted sales decline of roughly 25% and then 30% in back to back quarters. Nike has had its steepest annual revenue drop in modern history. Net income for the year collapsed by more than 80%. The stock is down about 75% from late-2021 highs.

On the flip side of the same coin, we have New Balance. They are riding the dad-shoe and functional-running wave. They’ve grown 19% to $9.2 billion in revenue. On Running, the Swiss performance shoe brand, has grown 67% YoY. ASICS, which has benefitted from both the retro resurgence and a broader return to running shoes, is up 18% YoY. Performance shoes are strong and fashion footwear is weak.

To reiterate: brands that bank on the identity and meaning of a shoe are losing, and brands that depend on the functionality and quality of a shoe are thriving. This is inverse typical footwear economics. For fifteen years we have assumed that performance was a commodity and culture was a deep moat that could not be assailed. Midsoles were easy to engineer but Nike made you feel something special when you laced up a pair of Jordans. Brands were chasing collabs, artist tie-ins, and limited drops because they wanted to create meaning.

Sneakers as a category are not dying. Global sneaker sales are around $90 billion and growing. People will buy more pairs this year than they did last. But the specific mechanism that made sneakers so profitable and used scarcity to boost prices is broken, permanently.

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Nobody pays double retail for a shoe because it is comfortable. The resale premium was always a tax on meaning, the dollar measure of how badly people wanted the thing for reasons that had nothing to do with putting it on their feet. When that premium was fat, the culture was healthy. The premium is now thin to nonexistent, and the speed of the collapse is the story.

In 2020, 58% of sneaker releases traded above retail on the secondary market. By 2024 that number had fallen to 47%. Read that plainly: more than half of all sneaker releases now lose money the moment they hit resale. The reseller margins that once routinely hit 100% on a hyped pair have compressed to something like 10% to 25% on the releases that still clear a profit at all. The trade that minted teenage entrepreneurs is now a low-margin grind.

The concentration data is just as telling. At Stadium Goods, one of the major consignment players, Nike and Jordan went from roughly 75% of sales in 2021 and 2022 to less than half today. The two names that were sneaker culture now account for a minority of what trades. And the vacuum has been filled by something revealing. The most-traded “loafer” of 2025 was the New Balance 1906L, a sneaker-loafer hybrid, and the best-selling non-sneaker brand on the secondary market became UGG. The hottest items on a sneaker resale platform are increasingly things that are leaving the category of sneaker altogether.

Even the apparent exceptions decay on inspection. The Adidas Samba was supposed to be the great counterexample, the proof that hype had simply rotated from Nike to the three stripes. But Samba search interest has fallen about 32% from its 2024 highs, and resale premiums on the prestige Wales Bonner collaborations dropped from 74% to 27%. Adidas did to the Samba exactly what Nike did to the Dunk, flooded the market until the scarcity that created the desire was gone. The Samba is not the future of sneaker hype. It is the last sneaker that mattered, and it is already fading.

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The hottest products on a sneaker resale site are now the ones that are barely sneakers.

Follow the infrastructure money

Shoe prices are the obvious place to look. The more convincing evidence is in the value of the businesses that were built to trade and talk about the shoes. When an entire industrial complex of marketplaces, media, and retail gets repriced at the same time, that is not a fashion cycle. That is a structural verdict.

Consider StockX, the company that turned sneakers into an asset class with a ticker-style price chart. In 2021 it had around $400 million in revenue at a $3.8 billion valuation on roughly $1.8 billion of gross merchandise value. By 2025 its gross merchandise value had risen to around $2.1 billion but was growing at essentially zero, and secondary-market estimates of the company’s worth imply something like a 75% discount to that 2021 figure. The platform that was the New York Stock Exchange of sneakers has itself flatlined and been marked down hard.

The carnage in physical and media infrastructure is more concrete. Two of Europe’s largest sneaker marketplaces, Restocks and Kikikickz, filed for bankruptcy. The US reseller chain Soleply filed for Chapter 11 and closed most of its stores. Eastbay, the catalog that taught a generation what to want, shut down at the end of 2022. There are now credible rumblings that Nike may dissolve the SNKRS app itself, following layoffs, and even if SNKRS survives, the fact that the rumor is plausible tells you something. SNKRS was the coliseum where the entire hype game was played.

And the media. Complex, the publication that functioned as the cultural nerve center of streetwear and sneakers, was reportedly bought by BuzzFeed for around $300 million in 2021 and sold in 2024 for roughly $109 million, a markdown of nearly two-thirds on the property best positioned to monetize the culture.

Put the write-downs together. The marketplaces, the retailers, and the media properties that made up the commercial scaffolding of sneaker culture have been collectively repriced down somewhere between half and three-quarters. The shoes are still selling. The businesses built on top of the shoes are being dismantled.

The attention left first

Before the money goes, the attention goes. And the people who made their living on sneaker attention describe its disappearance vividly.

The former head of Complex Sneakers has written about running hundreds of thousands of daily pageviews in the era when a handful of outlets, his own plus Sole Collector, Sneaker News, and Nice Kicks, functioned as the central nervous system of the culture. Everyone watched the same release calendar at the same time. That shared attention is gone. Release information now lives, in his phrase, “everywhere and nowhere at the same time,” scattered across brand apps and Discord servers and individual feeds, and the result is that nobody is doing the work of making you care.

His blunter diagnosis is the one that should worry every brand selling nostalgia: “collecting is just a millennial mindset. Gen Z aren’t nerdy like that.“ That is the entire demand-side thesis in a sentence. The sneakerhead was a millennial creation, and the generation that was supposed to inherit the hobby looked at it and declined. You cannot manufacture scarcity for an audience that does not want the thing in the first place.

This is the quietest and most important signal in the whole story, because attention is the leading indicator and revenue is the lagging one. By the time Jordan Brand reports a 16% decline, the cultural energy that would have prevented it left years earlier. The income statement is just the echo.

Read the producer’s panic

If you want to know what Nike sees in the data it does not show us, watch what it does rather than what it says. Nike has cut production on limited Jordan releases by about 35%. This is correct strategy. It is also a confession.

You do not cut a third of the supply of your scarcity franchise unless something has gone badly wrong with demand. We cannot see Nike’s internal numbers, the entries per pair on SNKRS, the sell-through rate on a given drop, the percentage of releases that now sit unsold. Nike can. And Nike has looked at those numbers and concluded that the situation is severe enough to justify sacrificing a third of its unit volume on its most important franchise to try to rebuild the illusion of scarcity. The size of the cut is a measure of the size of the problem they can see and we cannot.

The market gave us the visible version of this in 2024, when Jordans sat on shelves for months. That sentence would have been unintelligible in 2021, when a general-release Panda Dunk, the most ordinary mass-market shoe imaginable, resold for over $300. In the span of three years the constraint flipped completely. In 2021 the scarce thing was pairs. By 2024 the scarce thing was buyers.

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In 2021 the scarce resource was pairs. By 2024 it was buyers.

Where hype still works, and why it confirms the thesis

There is one corner of the sneaker world where scarcity still prints money, and it is the exception that proves the rule. It is women’s basketball.

Sales of WNBA signature sneakers on StockX jumped 938% from 2023 to 2024, and are on pace for another double-digit gain. From 2011 to 2022 there was exactly one WNBA signature shoe; now Sabrina Ionescu, A’ja Wilson, and Breanna Stewart have lines, with Caitlin Clark and Angel Reese following. Clark’s $190 Kobe player-exclusives sold out in minutes through the SNKRS lottery, the same mechanism that no longer reliably clears men’s Jordans. Jefferies expects women’s shoes and sportswear to outpace men’s over the next five years.

The collector instinct shows the same migration in an adjacent market. Card grader PSA processed about 58,000 WNBA cards in the first nine months of 2024 and roughly 159,000 in the same period of 2025, nearly tripling, and Caitlin Clark is now PSA’s second-most-graded basketball player behind Michael Jordan. The appetite to collect, to chase, to own the scarce thing did not die. It moved to the place where the meaning is genuinely new.

This is the key to the entire argument. Scarcity only generates premium when it is attached to meaning, and meaning has to be fresh. The men’s sneaker market did not run out of shoes. It ran out of new meaning. It spent the late 2010s selling the same nostalgia, the same retros, the same collaborations, to the same aging fans, while flooding supply to hit revenue targets, and the result was a culture that felt simultaneously oversaturated and creatively exhausted. Women’s basketball is where new meaning is being minted right now, and the money has followed the meaning exactly as theory predicts.

How it actually happened: a two-stage death

The collapse came in two distinct phases, and separating them clarifies the cause.

The first phase was financial, and it hit in 2022. The resale boom of 2020 and 2021 was a speculative bubble inflated by the same forces that inflated crypto, NFTs, and meme stocks: stimulus cash, near-zero interest rates, and pandemic supply constraints that made everything feel scarce. Average resale returns on a basket of popular sneakers ran around positive 23% in 2021 and then negative 7% in 2022 as every one of those conditions reversed at once. The Adidas split with Ye in late 2022 removed the single largest hype franchise from the board. The speculative layer broke first.

The second phase was cultural, and it arrived across late 2023 and 2024, when the primary market flipped and drops simply stopped selling out at retail. This was the death blow, because selling out was the entire game. The L was what made winning mean something. Once anyone could walk into a store and buy the shoe, the ritual lost its stakes, the resale flip lost its profit, and the identity that came from owning the hard-to-get thing lost its scarcity. The participatory structure that made someone a sneakerhead rather than a person who owns sneakers stopped functioning.

The cause underneath both phases is the same, and it is worth naming directly. The stimulus unwind pulled the trigger, but Nike’s own oversupply was the weapon. The strategy of the previous Nike regime, maximizing direct-to-consumer revenue by flooding the market with its most hyped silhouettes, monetized the scarcity premium aggressively right up until it destroyed the scarcity that created the premium. Nike sold its own mystique for a few years of revenue beats, and the bill arrived in the form of an 80%-plus collapse in annual net income and a stock down three-quarters.

The honest counterargument

A fair reader pushes back here, and the pushback deserves a real answer rather than a dismissal.

The strongest objection is that this is a cyclical hype correction, not a secular death. Sneaker culture has had winters before, and the most recent StockX data shows Nike and Jordan resale prices ticking up 5% to 6% year-over-year as the supply cuts begin to bite. Maybe scarcity gets rebuilt, premiums recover in 2027, and the people calling it a death look foolish for mistaking a trough for a grave.

The answer is in the composition of what is growing. In previous sneaker winters, the recovery came from inside the category, a new silhouette, a new collaboration, a new wave of the same basic enthusiasm. This time the growth is leaking out of the category entirely, into UGG and loafer-hybrids and performance running shoes bought by people who have no interest in the culture. The New Balance 1906L is not evidence of a sneaker recovery. It is an exit ramp out of sneakers and into comfortable shoes. A genuine revival would look like renewed passion for the thing itself, not migration toward its most utilitarian adjacent products.

The second objection is simpler and partly correct: that the sample of people declaring the death tends to be affluent, urban, and coastal, while sneaker culture’s historic core is none of those things. Nike’s best digital sales day on record was driven by a Jordan launch, which is not what a dead category does. This is fair, and the right response is to scope the claim honestly. The argument is not that the sneakerhead is extinct in every zip code today. It is that the taste-setting cohort, the young, urban, culturally fluent consumers whose preferences diffuse outward to everyone else over the following years, has already left. Loud-logo luxury died the same way, at the top first and everywhere else later. What is happening now at the cultural center will be the mainstream in three years.

So here is the falsifiable version, stated plainly so it can be checked against me later. If Jordan retro premiums on StockX durably re-expand through 2027 as Nike’s supply cuts take hold, and Jordan Brand revenue re-accelerates while Converse stabilizes, then this was a cycle and the death thesis was wrong. If instead the premiums stay thin, the growth keeps leaking into functional brands, and the cultural energy keeps draining toward women’s basketball and away from men’s retros, then the sneakerhead really is gone and the 2020-2021 mania was the last gasp of a dying subculture rather than the peak of a living one. I am betting on the second.

What it means for the money

Strip away the cultural eulogy and there is a clean investing frame underneath, which is the reason this matters beyond nostalgia. The thesis has a single mechanical consequence that drives everything that follows: a premium-margin business and a commodity-margin business are valued completely differently, and the sneaker industry is in the process of converting from the first kind into the second. The question for every name in the space is which side of that conversion it sits on.

Begin with the loser everyone already owns. Nike (NKE) is the central casualty, and the reason its stock has fallen roughly three-quarters from the 2021 high is that the market is slowly working out that it was paying a meaning multiple for what may turn out to be a utility business. At the peak, Nike’s gross margins sat in the mid-40s and its brand let it price hyped product at whatever the SNKRS lottery would bear. Fiscal 2025 saw revenue fall about 10% and net income collapse by more than 80%, and the bull case from here rests almost entirely on a single buried assumption: that the cultural energy returns, and that it returns to Nike specifically.

That assumption deserves to be challenged directly, because it is doing all the work in the recovery thesis. There are three possible futures. In the first, hype comes back and comes back to Nike, in which case the stock is cheap and the turnaround under Elliott Hill works. In the second, hype comes back but fragments across New Balance, On, Adidas, and whoever owns the next aesthetic, in which case Nike recovers some volume but never rebuilds the pricing power that justified its old margins. In the third, the premium-hype model is structurally smaller for everyone, and Nike’s path back to growth runs through ordinary athletic performance, where it competes on cushioning technology and wholesale distribution rather than cultural dominance. My read of the evidence in this piece is that the second and third futures are more likely than the first, and that the consensus recovery case is quietly underwriting the first. A Nike that wins on running tech is a perfectly good company that deserves a mid-20s multiple on normalized earnings. A Nike that owned the culture was a great company that earned a premium to that. The gap between those two valuations is the risk in the name, and I do not think it is fully priced even after a 75% decline, because the Street is still modeling a return to the old margin structure rather than a permanent step down from it.

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The market paid a meaning multiple for Nike. It is repricing toward a utility multiple, and the difference is the whole trade.

Now the winners, and here the caution is the opposite kind. The functional brands are the right businesses, but the market already knows it. On Holding (ONON) is the cleanest expression of the thesis: a performance-running brand with gross margins around 64%, EBITDA margins guided toward 20%, and constant-currency sales growth above 23%. It is everything Nike no longer is. The problem is the price. On trades at a forward P/E near 30 against a peer group in the high-20s and a trailing multiple that has at times looked absurd, which means the market has fully absorbed the functional-winner story and is charging for it. The business is exposed to almost none of what is killing the hype names, but the valuation leaves little room for a single soft quarter, and the entire enterprise rests on one brand. You are buying the right secular trend at a demanding price, which is a different risk than Nike’s but a real one.

Deckers (DECK) is the more interesting way to play the same shift, because it owns both ends of the functional barbell. Hoka is the performance-running engine, growing fast, and UGG is the comfort-and-warmth franchise that has quietly become the best-selling non-sneaker brand on the resale market. Deckers carries gross margins in the mid-50s, operating margins above 20%, and over a billion dollars of net cash, which is the kind of balance sheet that lets a company absorb a bad season without existential risk. The one thing to watch is the inventory build: free cash flow compressed sharply in a recent quarter as inventory nearly doubled, which introduces markdown risk if the demand does not show up to meet it. Deckers is the highest-quality business of the functional cohort, and the long-running On-versus-Deckers pair trade that circulates among consumer analysts is really a debate about paying up for pure growth versus paying a fairer price for diversified quality. The thesis in this piece favors the diversified-quality side, because UGG gives Deckers exposure to the exact migration out of sneakers and into comfort footwear that the resale data is screaming about.

Adidas deserves a specific warning rather than a recommendation. The bull case on Adidas is that the Samba and the broader terrace-sneaker wave proved it had stolen the cultural crown from Nike. The data in this piece argues the opposite: the Samba is a fading asset, its search interest down about a third and its collaboration premiums cut by two-thirds, and Adidas oversupplied it into the same scarcity-destroying spiral that hollowed out the Dunk. An Adidas thesis that extrapolates the Samba is extrapolating the last sneaker that mattered at exactly the wrong moment. The terrace wave is a late-cycle hype phenomenon, not a durable franchise, and treating it as the latter is the most common mistake in the current consumer-discretionary conversation.

Finally the speculative infrastructure, which faces the hardest road of anyone. StockX, GOAT, and the resale-dependent retailers built their entire business model as a tax on premium, and the premium is precisely what disappeared. StockX’s gross merchandise value has gone flat at roughly $2.1 billion while growing at essentially zero, and the secondary-market marks imply a valuation down around 75% from the 2021 peak. None of these are public, so there is no direct trade, but the read-through to the public ecosystem is clear. Foot Locker (FL), whose relevance was tied to its access to allocated hype product, has spent years as a value trap for exactly this reason, and any thesis that treats sneaker retail as a cheap turnaround needs to confront the possibility that the scarcity it depended on is not coming back. A business built to monetize a premium does not recover when the premium structurally compresses. It re-rates to whatever the commodity version of itself is worth, which is a great deal less.

The unifying lesson across all five is the same one the culture taught. Value in this industry was never in the shoe. It was in the meaning attached to the shoe, and the businesses that captured the most meaning earned the highest margins and the richest multiples. As the meaning drains out of the category and pools instead in a few new places, women’s basketball, genuine running performance, plain comfort, the financial value is following it with a lag, exactly the way the resale premium followed it on the way up. The investing mistake of the next three years will be paying meaning multiples for businesses that have quietly become utilities, and Nike is the largest and most tempting version of that mistake.

The teenager with the 9:55 alarm grew up. The strange and telling thing is that he did not pass the alarm down. The generation behind him looked at the whole apparatus, the lottery, the flip, the loss, the status, and found it neither aspirational nor interesting, and went off to buy comfortable running shoes and collect Caitlin Clark cards instead. The sneaker survived. It is the sneakerhead who is not coming back, and his death is being paid for, quarter by quarter, on the income statements of the companies that thought the meaning would last forever.

Thanks for reading & as always, stay curious!

—J&E

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Sources and figures: brand financials per company filings and Sportico, CNBC, and Footwear News reporting; resale data per WWD, Resell Calendar, StockX, and Axios/Altan Insights; platform and media valuations per Contrary Research, ECDB, and secondary-market estimates; valuation and margin figures for ONON and DECK per stockanalysis.com, Simply Wall St, and koalagains.com as of June 2026. Forward views are the author’s own opinion, are stated for discussion, and are not investment advice; the author may hold positions in names discussed.