
On May 15, 2026, Pope Leo XIV released Magnifica Humanitas, an encyclical on artificial intelligence and human dignity. Buried in its 242 sections is a diagnosis of our moment that most technology writing ignores: we aren’t just losing jobs—we are losing the meaning of work itself, speeding along a road to a meaningless future, and we can only seem to understand the potential efficiency gains.
This reframes the entire automation debate from a question of quantity (how many jobs remain?) to a question of quality (what kind of human activity counts as work?). And it suggests that our current policy responses—retraining programs, universal basic income proposals, labor market projections—are solving for the wrong problem.
The encyclical’s argument, developed across sections 148-156, is straightforward but radical: work is not primarily an economic input. It is a fundamental dimension of human flourishing, identity formation, and social participation. When we optimize for efficiency alone, and when we design systems that force workers to adapt to machine speed rather than machines that support human capability, we don’t just create unemployment. We create anomie: a society where large populations are economically superfluous and socially untethered.
What Work Actually Is (And Why Economics Got It Wrong)
To understand what the encyclical is warning against, we need to start with what work is.
The dominant economic view treats work as a commodity: labor is a factor of production, valued by what it produces, compensated by market rates. Under this framework, if machines can do it cheaper, workers should retrain for something else. If nothing else pays as well, that’s unfortunate but not the system’s problem. This view has produced three centuries of innovation and material progress and it has also produced a catastrophic semantics error.
Hannah Arendt, the political theorist, distinguished between labor, work, and action. Labor, she argued, is cyclical activity tied to biological necessity—it produces things that are immediately consumed and must be done again. Work produces durable objects. Action is the distinctly human capacity to begin something new, to create meaning through speech and deed in concert with others.¹ Under the economic model, we’ve collapsed work and labor into the same category. We treat both as interchangeable with machine processes, valued only by output.
The encyclical makes a different argument. It draws on papal tradition stretching back to Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum (1891), which insisted that work is “the essential key” to understanding the entire social question. Why? Because through work, humans “develop many dimensions of their existence.” Work is how we exercise freedom and creativity. It is how we participate in society. It is, quite literally, how we become ourselves.
The sociologist Studs Terkel, who spent his career interviewing American workers, captured this perfectly in his 1974 classic Working: “The search for meaning in one’s work is... a search for daily meaning as well as daily bread... It is about a search, too, for recognition, for a sense of identity.”² Most of the workers he interviewed—a steelworker, a nurse, a schoolteacher, a congressman—weren’t primarily concerned with wages. They were concerned with whether their work mattered, whether it was recognized, whether it allowed them to be someone.
This is what the encyclical means when it says work “expresses and enhances the dignity of our lives.” It’s a claim about anthropology and not economics. That’s why when you hear someone say, “Well, the Pope isn’t some economist, so why the hell should I listen to his encyclical?” you should reply, “This is about what it means to be human; and he’s an expert in that.”
The problem with current automation discourse is that it accepts the economic framework entirely. It asks: “How do we retrain displaced workers?” “What is the wage floor for jobs machines can’t do?” “Should we implement UBI?” These are important questions. But they leave untouched the deeper issue: even for workers who remain employed, what happens to work’s meaning when you are designed to serve the machine’s speed?
What’s Happening Now
This level of analysis isn’t accessible in the NYTimes, Wall Street Journal, or the FT. We’re writing about things of the future with extreme rigor. We’re thinking about questions like: how can we design automation that augments rather than replaces?
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Contrary to popular assumption, job loss from automation has been gradual and uneven across sectors. The Bureau of Labor Statistics tracks employment by occupation, and the picture is more complicated than “robots replaced workers.” Manufacturing employment has declined sharply—from about 19% of US employment in 1970 to roughly 8% today—but this is as much about offshoring and trade as automation per se.³
What is happening is something subtler: the structure of work itself is changing.
First: Deskilling and Task Fragmentation
The economist David Autor has spent two decades studying labor market polarization. His research shows that since 1990, employment growth has concentrated at the high end (professional, managerial jobs requiring advanced skills) and the low end (service work requiring minimal training). The middle—skilled manufacturing, clerical work, technical roles—has hollowed out.⁴
But Autor’s more recent work points to something more troubling: even within job categories, the nature of work has changed. In a 2022 paper co-authored with colleagues, he documents how digital systems have enabled employers to fragment tasks into smaller, more routine components. A radiologist no longer reads X-rays for a patient; they process images in a workflow determined by an algorithm. A warehouse worker no longer manages inventory; they pick items according to GPS-guided paths optimized for speed.⁵
The encyclical captures this precisely: “while AI promises to boost productivity by taking over mundane tasks, it frequently forces workers to adapt to the speed and demands of machines, rather than machines being designed to support those who work. As a result, contrary to the advertised benefits of AI, current approaches to technology can paradoxically de-skill workers, subject them to automated surveillance and relegate them to rigid and repetitive tasks.”⁶
This is not theoretical. It is documented in ethnographic work by sociologist Sarah Roberts on content moderation, journalist Kashmir Hill on algorithmic management, and researchers at MIT examining warehouse automation. The pattern is consistent: workers are not being replaced by systems; they are being integrated into systems as interchangeable components.⁷
Second: Surveillance and Loss of Agency
One of the most studied dimensions of modern work is what management theorists call “algorithmic management.” Amazon warehouse workers have their productivity tracked in real time by a system that can fire them if their rate drops below a threshold. Uber and DoorDash drivers have no negotiation with the algorithm that assigns them work. Gig economy workers have even less; they are perpetually evaluated by opaque rating systems they cannot contest.⁸
The encyclical is explicit on this: surveillance “removes all safeguards against the unchecked pursuit of profit” and transforms workers into objects to be monitored and optimized rather than agents with judgment and discretion.⁹
The sociologist Kathi Weeks has written extensively on this: “Once labor becomes the dominant horizon of identity and value, we are left in a precarious position when work is unavailable or insufficient. The promise of work has always been that it would provide not only income but also identity, purpose, and social belonging. When that promise fails, as it increasingly does, people are left adrift.”¹⁰
This is what economists are starting to measure as “job quality” rather than just “job quantity.” A 2023 analysis by the Economic Policy Institute found that while headline unemployment remains relatively low in developed economies, measures of job quality—wage growth, benefits, job security, scheduling predictability—have stagnated or declined.¹¹
Third: The Paradox of Productivity Without Wages
Here is where the numbers become genuinely alarming.
From 1979 to 2022, US worker productivity (output per hour) grew by approximately 64%. Real wages for median workers grew by approximately 17%.¹² This is not coincidental. It represents a fundamental decoupling between what workers produce and what they earn.
This means workers are producing far more value per hour but capturing almost none of it. The encyclical calls this out directly: “income from capital risks replacing income from labor, which is often confined to the margins of the economic system’s primary interests.”¹⁴
For white-collar workers in finance, tech, and professional services, the dynamics are different but equally concerning. Wage growth has been better, but job security has evaporated. The average job tenure for college-educated workers has declined from 7.5 years in 1990 to 5.2 years in 2020.¹⁵ The implicit contract—loyalty in exchange for security—has been replaced by continuous risk transfer onto individuals.
Why This Matters: The Social Stability Problem
Here is the uncomfortable truth that most policy discussions avoid: work is not just an economic issue. It is the fundamental mechanism through which individuals integrate into society.
The sociologist Robert Putnam documented this exhaustively in Bowling Alone (2000). He showed that economic dislocation from manufacturing decline in the 1980s and 1990s was followed not just by poverty but by social dissolution—rising divorce rates, declining civic participation, increased substance abuse, mortality rates that rose with economic despair.¹⁶
The epidemiologist Anne Case and economist Angus Deaton have updated this analysis, documenting “deaths of despair”—suicides, substance abuse, cirrhosis—that spike in regions with severe employment decline.¹⁷ Their work shows that the relationship between job loss and mortality is mediated by meaning: individuals who experience work not as central to their identity are more resilient to employment loss than those who do.
The political consequence is equally clear. The political scientist Katherine J. Cramer has shown that regions hit hardest by automation and globalization show the strongest shifts toward populist and anti-establishment politics, not because of poverty per se (some economically worse-off regions show less political volatility) but because of the erosion of status and recognition.¹⁸
This is why the encyclical keeps returning to work’s social and cultural dimensions. It isn’t just nostalgia, but rather, it is a sober assessment that large populations without meaningful work participation constitute a social stability risk.
The encyclical states it directly: “A society that guarantees employment to only a small fraction of the population, despite having a high level of technical development, risks exposing many to forced inactivity, a lack of responsibility and the absence of daily tasks and stimuli, resulting in human and cultural impoverishment. This creates a paradox of material progress and anthropological regression that undermines the foundations of a just and stable social peace.”¹⁹
The Wage Is Not the Problem
The standard approaches to automation anxiety fall into two camps. The left proposes stronger unions, higher minimum wages, and stronger job protections. The right proposes job retraining, lower regulatory burden, and faith in new industries emerging. Both assume the problem is primarily distributional: how do we ensure workers get paid enough?
But if the encyclical is right—and the sociological evidence suggests it is—the problem is not definitional, not just distributional. It is about what kinds of human activity count as work, what agency workers have within that work, and whether work remains a path to dignity and social participation.
This is why the economist Daron Acemoglu, one of the world’s leading voices on technology and labor, has pushed back hard on techno-optimism. In his 2023 book Power and Progress (co-authored with Simon Johnson), Acemoglu argues that the problem with current automation is not that it displaces workers—all technological change does that—but that it is labor-replacing rather than labor-complementing.²⁰
A labor-complementing technology makes workers more productive. A printing press required typesetters; it didn’t replace them, but made them more valuable. A labor-replacing technology simply substitutes for workers. An ATM made bank tellers more efficient, but also enabled banks to reduce teller employment by 50% even as branch density increased.
The distinction matters because it determines whose power increases. Labor-complementing technology shifts bargaining power to workers (you need them to operate the technology). Labor-replacing technology shifts power to capital (you don’t need workers at all).
Acemoglu’s argument: most recent automation has been labor-replacing because that is what capitalists choose to invest in. It is cheaper to automate away work than to invest in technology that makes workers more capable. This is a choice, not an inevitability.
The encyclical makes a similar point: “The pursuit of greater profits cannot justify choices that systematically sacrifice jobs, because the human person is an end, not a means, and the economic order must remain subordinate to human dignity and the common good.”²¹
This is where the encyclical parts ways with standard economic reasoning. It is arguing for a different kind of technological progress—one designed to expand human capability rather than replace it, that increases worker agency rather than constraining it, that maintains work as a path to dignity rather than reducing it to cost-minimization.
The encyclical is not naive about this. It proposes concrete criteria, developed across sections 154-156:
First: Social Criteria for Innovation “Every introduction of automation and AI should be accompanied by verifiable measures to protect the employment, retraining and participation of workers.”²²
This isn’t some Luddite policy; it’s just intentional and aware of the risks. It means: before you automate, ask—what happens to the workers in this system? What retraining do they need? How do they participate in the decision? Do you measure success only by cost reduction, or also by job quality? A more holistic anaylsis of the impact of one’s actions is all that’s being asked for.
Companies do this for some decisions. They conduct environmental impact assessments. They model supply chain risks. The encyclical is proposing labor impact assessment as equally rigorous and mandatory.
Second: Proactive Rather Than Reactive Policy “We must oversee the transformation in advance... at this time of transition, it is not enough to react only when jobs disappear; we must oversee the transformation in advance.”²³
This is directed at governments, but the logic applies to industries. Rather than waiting for displacement and then proposing retraining, plan for transition. Singapore has done this: when it began automation in manufacturing, it simultaneously invested in high-skill sectors and retraining. Germany’s apprenticeship system is partly designed around this—career transitions are managed, not abandoned to market forces. We can already see today firms like Ford and groups like Bloomberg Philanthropies who recently committed $90 million to training new electricians and tradespeople directly out of college—this is the right direction to be headed.
Third: Corporate Commitment to Job Quality “There needs to be a corporate commitment to include quality and dignity of work among its indicators of success.”²⁴
This is the radical proposal. Make job quality a metric of success alongside profit. Not instead of profit—alongside it. If you’re automating, you measure success not just by cost savings but by whether remaining workers have more autonomy, higher wages, better working conditions.
Some companies do this. Patagonia measures employee satisfaction and turnover. John Lewis (employee-owned) balances profit with worker welfare. It is not impossible; it is just uncommon.
The economist and labor scholar Erik Brynjolfsson has proposed something similar: a “metrics revolution” in how companies measure the value created by technology. Include not just shareholder return but worker wage growth, job security, and reported meaning in work.²⁵
The Institutional Pressure Building
One reason to take the encyclical seriously is that similar diagnoses are emerging from unexpected places.
The American labor economist David Autor, no radical, has recently shifted his position. In a 2022 paper, he acknowledges that while technological unemployment has not occurred, “technological anxiety” about work quality is justified. His conclusion: “We need to be more intentional about designing technology to augment rather than replace human workers, and about ensuring the gains from productivity growth are broadly shared.”²⁶
The business strategist Michael Porter and the economist Jan Rivkin published a major Harvard Business Review article in 2023 arguing that “the economic machine is breaking down” because “companies have optimized for short-term shareholder value at the expense of worker welfare, long-term innovation, and social stability.”²⁷ They propose that companies reorient toward “shared value”—explicitly balancing profit with stakeholder wellbeing, including workers.
The World Economic Forum’s 2023 Future of Jobs report surveyed 800+ companies globally and found that 45% are concerned about labor disruption from automation, but 78% are concerned about labor disruption combined with inability to attract and retain talent due to job quality issues.²⁸ Companies are starting to realize: you can automate away jobs, but you cannot automate away the social consequences.
The financial implications are becoming clear. Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock, wrote in his 2023 letter to CEOs that companies must demonstrate they are creating value for workers alongside shareholders, or institutional investors will begin to divest. This is not because Fink has become a socialist. It is because long-term capital returns depend on social stability, educated workforces, and functioning institutions—all of which are threatened by large populations excluded from meaningful work.²⁹
The encyclical, then, is not prophesying something new. It is giving institutional voice to a diagnosis that economists, sociologists, and business strategists are already making.
The Specific Vulnerability of Financial Services
Your industry is changing and you need to be ahead of the curve. If you work in finance, consulting, or tech, this is for you. Those who will thrive in this coming AI-era are those who adopted the technology and adapted to the new reality earliest.
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For readers in finance, consulting, and technology (the constituencies most represented in our subscriber base) this has specific implications.
These sectors have been among the most aggressive in automation. JPMorgan’s COIN (Contract Intelligence) uses AI to review commercial loan agreements, reducing what took lawyers 360,000 hours to perform in seconds. Consulting firms use algorithmic tools to structure engagements and assign staff. Tech companies are notorious for optimizing for speed and efficiency, with worker wellness as a secondary consideration.
The result: these sectors also have among the highest burnout rates, lowest job tenure, and lowest reported meaning in work. A 2023 Harvard Business School survey found that 54% of management consultants report their work lacks meaning.³⁰ A similar survey of tech workers found 62% report high stress and 31% have seriously considered leaving their jobs.³¹
When your industry optimizes for billable hours or quarterly targets or user growth, you design work that extracts value efficiently. You do not design work that sustains human flourishing.
The encyclical’s proposal would flip this. It would ask: could we design JPMorgan’s legal automation to augment lawyers’ capability rather than replace them? Could consulting firms measure success not just by utilization rates but by whether junior consultants are developing real skills? Could tech companies compete not just on growth but on whether their employees feel their work matters?
Companies that figure out how to generate value through meaningful work rather than by extracting value from workers will have advantages in talent retention, innovation, and social license. The companies that compete solely on efficiency will find themselves fragile.
What Doesn’t Change
The encyclical is not proposing that we stop using technology or that profit is bad. It is not arguing for a return to pre-industrial work. It is not suggesting that all workers should love their jobs.
What it is proposing is purpose and deliberateness: that we design technological systems with human dignity as a constraint, not an afterthought. That we measure success by whether work allows human flourishing, not just whether it generates shareholder returns. That we shift from labor-replacing automation to labor-complementing automation.
This is radical only in comparison to current practice. Historically, many societies have built in such constraints. Scandinavian countries have codetermination laws requiring worker representation in technology decisions. Germany’s apprenticeship system is designed around skill development alongside employment. Japan’s postwar labor system (while flawed) built long-term worker welfare into competitive strategy.
These are not perfect models. But they are proof of concept: you can build capitalism that prioritizes work dignity without collapsing into socialism.
The encyclical’s fundamental claim is this: work is not a problem to be solved through technology. Work is a solution—to the human need for identity, participation, and dignity. When we design systems that erode work’s capacity to provide these things, we do not solve a problem. We create one.
The challenge facing your industry—finance, technology, consulting—is this: Can you continue to extract value from workers optimized for speed and efficiency? Probably, for a while. Will this be stable long-term? Almost certainly not. Social dissolution catches up with capital eventually.
Or can you design systems that generate value through meaningful work? That augment worker capability rather than replacing it? That measure success by whether work allows human flourishing?
The encyclical is arguing that the second path is not just morally right. It is practically necessary. The sociologists, economists, and business strategists making the same argument are suggesting it is becoming competitively necessary as well.
The question is whether your industry will move toward this intentionally, or whether it will be forced to move by social and political pressure after instability builds. The encyclical is betting on the former. The evidence suggests we should too.
Thanks for reading folks & as always, stay curious!
—J&E
References
Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (University of Chicago Press, 1958), chapters 2-3. Arendt’s distinction between labor, work, and action remains foundational to contemporary thinking on work’s meaning.
Studs Terkel, Working: People Talk About What They Do All Day and How They Feel About What They Do (Pantheon Books, 1974), xii. Terkel interviewed 133 people across occupations and found consistent emphasis on meaning over compensation.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Manufacturing Employment and Hours,” accessed 2026. Manufacturing employment peaked at 19.4% of total employment in 1970 and has declined to 8.1% as of 2025. Debate continues over how much is attributable to automation vs. globalization, with most economists citing both as significant factors.
David H. Autor, “The Polarization of Job Opportunities in the U.S. Labor Market,” Center for Economic and Business Research, April 2010. Autor’s seminal work on job polarization, updated regularly. See also: David Autor, “Why Are There Still So Many Jobs?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2015): 3-30.
David H. Autor, Danielle Cho, Lena Edmondson, Ann Huff Stevens, and Mariel Schwarz, “The New Hazards of Digital-Era Monopolies,” National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper 29231 (2022).
Pope Leo XIV, Magnifica Humanitas (Vatican Press, May 15, 2026), section 150. The encyclical draws on the 2025 Vatican Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith Note Antiqua et Nova, section 67, which provides similar analysis.
Sarah T. Roberts, Behind the Screen: Content Moderation in the Shadows of Social Media (Yale University Press, 2019). Roberts’ ethnographic work documents how content moderation workers are integrated into algorithmic systems with minimal autonomy. See also: Kashmir Hill, “Amazon Drivers Are Ditching the Company for Gig Work,” Wired, February 2021; and MIT researchers Dholakia and Simonson on warehouse automation worker experiences.
See: Kathi Weeks, The Problem with Work (Duke University Press, 2011), and her more recent article “The Refusal of Work,” South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 117, No. 3 (2018). Also: Taina Bucher, If... Then: Algorithmic Culture, Power, and Politics (Oxford University Press, 2018), on how algorithmic management structures worker agency.
Pope Leo XIV, Magnifica Humanitas, section 171.
Kathi Weeks, “The Refusal of Work,” 518.
Economic Policy Institute, “The State of American Workers in 2023: Job Quality Remains Poor Amid Economic Uncertainty,” March 2023. The analysis measures job quality across wage, benefits, job security, and scheduling predictability dimensions.
Data from Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Productivity and Costs,” and Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). Productivity measured as output per hour in the nonfarm business sector. Real wages adjusted for inflation using CPI-U.
Economic Policy Institute calculation cited in “The Productivity-Pay Gap,” updated annually. The figure of $13,891 represents annual wages that would be earned by a median worker if wage growth had tracked productivity growth from 1979-2022.
Pope Leo XIV, Magnifica Humanitas, section 160.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Employee Tenure Survey,” various years. The average job tenure for college-educated workers declined from 7.5 years in 1990 to 5.2 years in 2020, representing a significant shift in employment stability.
Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (Simon & Schuster, 2000). While controversial in some specifics, Putnam’s documentation of correlation between economic dislocation and civic participation decline is well-supported.
Anne Case and Angus Deaton, Deaths of Despair and the Future of Capitalism (Princeton University Press, 2020). Case and Deaton demonstrate that “deaths of despair” (suicides, substance abuse, cirrhosis) spike in regions experiencing severe economic dislocation from manufacturing decline, with the mechanism mediated through loss of meaning and status.
Katherine J. Cramer, The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker (University of Chicago Press, 2016). Cramer’s work shows that political radicalism correlates not with poverty per se but with perceived status loss relative to other groups.
Pope Leo XIV, Magnifica Humanitas, section 154.
Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs, 2023). Acemoglu argues that technological progress is not inevitable—the choice to pursue labor-replacing vs. labor-complementing automation is a deliberate one reflecting power distribution.
Pope Leo XIV, Magnifica Humanitas, section 152.
Ibid., section 156.
Ibid., section 156.
Ibid., section 156.
Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, Machine, Platform, Crowd: Harnessing Our Digital Future (W.W. Norton, 2017). Brynjolfsson has developed this metrics framework more fully in recent speeches and articles, proposing that companies measure and optimize for worker welfare alongside profit.
David H. Autor, “The Paradox of Abundance,” Brookings Institution, 2022. Note: this represents a shift from Autor’s earlier positions, reflecting his response to emerging evidence on job quality degradation.
Michael E. Porter and Jan W. Rivkin, “The Looming Challenge to U.S. Competitiveness,” Harvard Business Review, July-August 2023. Porter and Rivkin argue that short-termism in capital allocation has eroded the foundations of American competitiveness, particularly through labor market dynamics.
World Economic Forum, Future of Jobs Report 2023 (Global Competitiveness Index, 2023). The survey of 807 companies found significant anxiety about labor disruption, with companies increasingly concerned that automation without attention to job quality creates talent retention problems.
Larry Fink, “Letter to CEOs,” BlackRock, 2023. Fink has increasingly emphasized stakeholder capitalism and worker welfare as components of long-term shareholder value creation.
Harvard Business School, “The State of Management Consulting 2023,” Working Knowledge Series, 2023. The survey found 54% of management consultants report meaninglessness in their work, 67% report high stress, and 41% have considered leaving the profession.
Blind Employee Survey on Tech Industry Job Satisfaction, 2023. Survey of approximately 30,000 tech workers showed 62% report high stress, 31% seriously considering leaving tech, and consistent themes of meaninglessness despite high compensation.