Let’s talk about Kevin Warsh and how he’s going to impact the United States economy in the coming years.

He’s got the resume: Stanford, Harvard Law, Morgan Stanley M&A, youngest-ever Fed governor at 35, a seat at the table during the 2008 crisis. He understands markets. He understands the institution. When his name surfaced as Trump’s pick last Thursday, the collective exhale from Wall Street was almost audible. This could have been worse. I’m talking Kevin Hassett worse.

“Better than the alternative” is not a standard for selecting the most powerful economic policymaker on Earth. The fact that we’re grading on a curve—relieved that the president didn’t pick someone with zero central banking experience as some crony loyalty reward—tells you everything about how broken this process has become.

Let’s start with the market reaction, because it’s instructive.

Within hours of Warsh’s nomination on Friday, gold crashed 11%—its worst day since 2013. Silver dropped 31%, the steepest single-day decline since the Hunt Brothers collapsed the market in 1980. The dollar spiked from four-year lows. Precious metals shed roughly $15 trillion in value over 48 hours.

Warsh’s monetary policy views were most likely not even a factor in these reactions. Rather, it was about what his nomination resolved: months of uncertainty about whether Trump would install a loyalist who’d cut on command. Gold and silver had been surging partly on fears that the Fed’s independence was about to evaporate. When Warsh—a credible institutionalist—got the nod instead of Kevin Hassett, the “Fed capture” trade unwound violently.

In other words, markets moved more on the resolution of political uncertainty than they did on any earnings report this quarter. That’s not how this is supposed to work. This is eerily reminiscent of the way that markets surged after TACO–the best thing for equity markets appears to be the absence of the crisis that was once priced in.

It also reminds me of the best strategy for fixing a sports bet with a man on the inside: underperform for an entire season, fix the odds against you, and then outperform. Donald…?

Credit where it’s due: Warsh is a defensible choice.

During his time on the Fed Board from 2006 to 2011, he was one of the more hawkish voices—at times opposing rate cuts during the financial crisis out of concern that inflation risks were being underestimated. He’s been a longtime critic of quantitative easing and the Fed’s balance sheet expansion. More recently, he’s argued that AI-driven productivity gains could allow the economy to grow faster without triggering inflation, which would justify lower rates. His view has evolved, but it’s rooted in analysis, not just politics. Keep in mind that note about AI-productivity. We, as market participants, will need to figure out if this is his true theory causing a switch from hawkishness to dovishness or if this is just a guise to justify cutting rates on Trump’s behalf.

He’s also been explicit about the importance of Fed independence…at least in principle. “I have strongly believed for 20 years, and history tells us, that the independent operations in the conduct of monetary policy is essential,” he said last summer. That’s reassuring, even if his recent calls for “regime change” at the Fed and his criticisms of Powell’s forays into climate policy suggest he’s not above playing to his audience.

Compare this to Hassett, who was reportedly the frontrunner for weeks. Hassett is the director of the National Economic Council—a political operative with no central banking experience. Hassett wrote the infamous “Dow 36,000: The New Strategy for Profiting from the Coming Rise in the Stock Market.” Infamously wrong. Hassett argued that stocks were undervalued and that investors were irrationally demanding risk premiums for stocks compared to bonds. In other words, he thought stocks were not riskier than bonds in the long run. Not only did the market crash soon after the publication (during the dot-com bubble), but the core argument was spectacularly wrong. His selection would have been a pure loyalty play, a signal that the Fed was being folded into the executive branch. Prediction markets had him as the favorite until the final days. America dodged that outcome, but barely.

Here’s what the Warsh nomination actually looked like:

Eleven candidates were reportedly considered. The selection was led by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, but the ultimate decision rested with a president who has been publicly berating the current Fed chair for years and who stated explicitly that wanting lower rates would be a “litmus test” for candidates. The process stretched over months, with prediction markets swinging wildly, leaks to the press, and constant speculation about who had the inside track.

Meanwhile, Powell’s term doesn’t end until May. That’s a four-month lame-duck period during which the sitting chair knows he’s been the target of a DOJ investigation (widely seen as political pressure), knows his successor was selected partly based on willingness to cut rates, and knows the president views him as an obstacle. Senator Thom Tillis has announced he’ll block any Fed nominee until that DOJ probe is resolved, adding another layer of political theater to a process that’s supposed to be above politics.

The Fed’s power doesn’t come from its balance sheet or its regulatory authority. It comes from credibility. When the Fed says inflation will be 2%, markets and businesses and consumers adjust their behavior accordingly and that adjustment is what makes the target achievable. Credibility is the mechanism. When that credibility erodes, monetary policy stops working. Literally, it stops working.

Every time a president tweets about rate cuts, every time a nominee is vetted for political loyalty, every time the confirmation process becomes a hostage negotiation, the Fed’s credibility takes a small hit. None of these hits are fatal on their own. But they compound. And we’re compounding them fast.

The Fed chair has always been a presidential appointment. That’s not going to change, nor should it. But there’s a difference between democratic accountability and political capture. The current system is drifting toward the latter.

A few reforms worth considering:

Stagger the terms. The Fed chair’s four-year term currently aligns closely with presidential election cycles, which maximizes the political stakes of each appointment. Longer terms, or terms that begin mid-cycle, would reduce the incentive to treat the Fed as a political prize.

Start the process earlier. Nominating a successor four months before the term ends is insane. It creates unnecessary uncertainty, compresses the confirmation timeline, and gives markets months to speculate. A norm (or rule) requiring nominations 12-18 months in advance would smooth the transition and depoliticize the moment.

Establish clearer criteria. Right now, there’s no formal standard for what qualifies someone to lead the Fed. The president can nominate anyone, and the Senate can confirm or reject for any reason. Explicit criteria—central banking experience, academic credentials, demonstrated independence—wouldn’t bind anyone legally, but they’d create a benchmark against which nominees could be judged.

Enforce norms against public pressure. Presidents have always had opinions about interest rates. But previous administrations kept those opinions private, preserving the appearance of Fed independence even when they disagreed with policy. Trump has shattered that norm. Rebuilding it will require either self-restraint from future presidents (unlikely) or some kind of institutional pushback, perhaps from the Fed itself, perhaps from Congress, perhaps from markets.

None of these reforms are silver bullets. Central bank independence is ultimately a norm, not a law, and norms can always be broken. But norms are strengthened by institutions, and right now our institutions are pointing in the wrong direction.

Kevin Warsh will probably do a decent job. He has the experience, the temperament, and enough institutional credibility to push back on the White House if needed. Markets have calmed down. The adults, such as they are, appear to be in charge.

But, we should stress the fact that we got lucky. The selection process was driven by loyalty tests, political theater, and presidential grievance. The fact that it produced a competent nominee is incidental. Merely a function of Warsh’s personal relationships and the specific dynamics of this moment, not the system working as designed.

The Fed is the most important economic institution in the world. The dollar’s status as the global reserve currency, the stability of inflation expectations, the functioning of credit markets. All of it rests on the belief that the Fed will act based on economic conditions, not political pressure.

That belief is not self-sustaining. It has to be maintained. And right now, we’re not maintaining it. We’re stress-testing it.

Warsh is fine. The question is what happens next time, when the nominee isn’t fine, when the Senate is more pliant, when the norms have eroded a little further. We’re building toward that moment. The Warsh nomination should be a wake-up call, not a relief.

See ya, folks. Stay curious.

--J&E